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Abstract
We consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to ex-
press indifference in their preference lists (i.e., each list can be partially ordered).
We prove that, in an instance where indifference takes the form of ties, the set of
strongly stable matchings forms a distributive lattice. However, we show that this lat-
tice structure may be absent if indifference is in the form of arbitrary partial orders.
Also, for a given stable marriage instance with ties, we characterise strongly stable
matchings in terms of perfect matchings in bipartite graphs. Finally, we briefly out-
line an alternative proof of the known result that, in a stable marriage instance with
indifference in the form of arbitrary partial orders, the set of super-stable matchings
forms a distributive lattice.
Keywords: Stable marriage problem; Partial order; Tie; Strong stability; Super-stability;
Distributive lattice
1 Introduction
The classical stable marriage problem (SM) and its many variants have been widely studied
in the literature [10, 5, 14]. An instance I of SM involves n men and n women, each of
whom ranks all n members of the opposite sex in strict order of preference. A matching is
a one-one correspondence between the men and women in I. We say that a (man,woman)
pair (x, y) is a blocking pair for M if x prefers y to pM (x), and y prefers x to pM (y),
where pM (q) denotes q’s partner in M , for any person q in I. A matching that admits no
blocking pair is said to be stable. It is known that every instance of SM admits at least
one stable matching [3], and in general there may be many [7]. Moreover, the set of stable
matchings for a given instance of SM forms a finite distributive lattice under a natural
relation of dominance, denoted ¹ (Knuth [10] attributes this result to John Conway). One
stable matching M dominates another stable matching M ′ if every man has at least as
good a partner in M as he has in M ′. The man-oriented Gale/Shapley algorithm [3] finds,
in O(n2) time, the top element of this lattice, called the man-optimal stable matching.
This is the unique stable matching in which each man has his best possible partner (and
each woman her worst) among all stable matchings. Similarly, by considering the woman-
oriented version of this algorithm, we may find the bottom element of the lattice, the
woman-optimal stable matching.
The exploitation of this lattice structure has led to the formulation of efficient algo-
rithms for a number of problems associated with SM, for example finding all stable pairs
(i.e., determining, for each man m and woman w, whether m and w are partners in some
∗Supported by grant GR/M13329 from the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.
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stable matching) [4], generating all stable matchings [4], finding a so-called egalitarian sta-
ble matching [8] and finding a so-called minimum regret stable matching [4]1, and plays a
key role in establishing the #P-completeness of the problem of counting stable matchings
[7]. Many of these problems arise naturally in practical applications such as large-scale
centralised matching schemes. Perhaps the largest and best-known of these schemes is
the National Resident Matching Program in the US, which administers the annual assign-
ment of graduating medical students to hospital posts, and employs an extension of the
Gale/Shapley algorithm for SM [13].
A natural generalisation of SM arises when each person need not rank all members
of the opposite sex in strict order. It is possible that some of those involved might be
indifferent among certain members of the opposite sex, so that preference lists may be
partially ordered. We use SMP to stand for this variant of SM, and in such a setting,
it may be convenient to refer to a person’s (partially ordered) preference list as his/her
preference poset. The restriction of SMP in which the indifference takes the form of ties in
the preference posets (i.e. each preference poset is a weak order [1]) is denoted by SMT. If
a person q precedes a person r in a person p’s preference poset, then we say that p strictly
prefers q to r; if q and r are incomparable in p’s preference poset, then we say that p is
indifferent between them. Irving [6] formulates three possible definitions for stability for
SMP. A matching M is weakly stable if there is no couple (x, y), each of whom strictly
prefers the other to his/her partner in M . Also, a matching M is strongly stable if there is
no couple (x, y) such that x strictly prefers y to his/her partner in M , and y either strictly
prefers x to his/her partner in M or is indifferent between them. Finally, a matching M
is super-stable if there is no couple (x, y), each of whom either strictly prefers the other
to his/her partner in M or is indifferent between them. Clearly a super-stable matching
is strongly stable, and a strongly stable matching is weakly stable. The definition of a
blocking pair for each of these three stability criteria is analogous to that for SM, and
henceforth, the particular stability criterion to which the term applies should be clear
from the context.
In practical situations, it is arguable that strong stability is the most appropriate
stability definition. For, there appears to be no real incentive for a man or woman to
form a blocking pair of a matching if each is indifferent between the other and his/her
partner in the matching. Thus there is a sense in which the super-stability criterion is
too extreme. However, there is also a sense in which the weak stability criterion is too
weak: a man m who strictly prefers a woman w to his partner in a matching might offer
a bribe to w if she is indifferent between m and her partner in the matching, to try to
tempt w into exchanging her partner for m. Clearly the weak stability of a matching
cannot exclude blocking pairs that may arise from this practical case; however the strong
stability definition does. The latter stability criterion will be the main focus of this paper.
On the other hand, an example context in which super-stability is relevant is when there
is uncertainty in the preference lists. Suppose that, in a stable marriage instance, we wish
to find a stable matching (in the classical sense), but for some or all of the participants we
have only partial information regarding preferences. In general, each preference ‘list’ may
be expressable only as a partial order, and the particular linear extension that represents
a participant’s true preferences is unknown. It is not difficult to see that a matching M in
an instance I of SMP is super-stable if and only if M is stable in every instance of SMT
1The egalitarian and minimum regret stable matching problems may be defined as follows. Given an
instance I of SM and a stable matching M in I, the cost of M for a man m is the ranking of pM (m) in m’s
preference list. The cost of M for a woman is defined similarly. The egalitarian stable matching problem
is to find a stable matching M in I such that the total cost of M summed over all men and women is
minimised. The minimum regret stable matching problem is to find a stable matching M in I such that
the maximum cost of M taken over all men and women is minimised.
2
m1 : w1 w2 w3 w1 : (m1 m2) m3
m2 : w1 w3 w2 w2 : m1 m3 m2
m3 : w1 w2 w3 w3 : m2 m3 m1
Men’s preferences Women’s preferences
Figure 1: An instance of SMT with no man-optimal weakly stable matching.
obtained from I by forming linear extensions of the preference posets in I. Therefore a
super-stable matching is one that is stable no matter which linear extensions of the various
preference posets represent the true preferences.
Also, in practice, ties seem to be the most natural form of indifference. For, if a man
is indifferent between one woman w1 and another woman w2, and he is also indifferent
between w2 and a third woman w3, then it is reasonable to assume that he is indifferent
between w1 and w3 (i.e., indifference is ‘transitive’). Nevertheless, in this paper our stan-
dard definition of indifference allows a partially ordered list for full structural generality,
since partially ordered preference lists are the natural relaxation of totally ordered lists.
For a given instance I of SMP, the existence of a weakly stable matching is guaranteed:
by resolving the indifference in I arbitrarily (i.e. by forming a linear extension of each
preference poset), we obtain an instance I ′ of SM, and it is clear that a stable matching
in I ′ is weakly stable in I. (Thus a weakly stable matching for I may be found in O(n2)
time, using the Gale/Shapley algorithm.) On the other hand, it is straightforward to
construct instances of SMT which admit no strongly stable matching and/or no super-
stable matching; see [6] for further details. However, Irving [6] presents O(n4) and O(n2)
algorithms for respectively determining whether a strongly stable matching and/or a super-
stable matching exists in a given instance of SMP, and in each case, if such a matching
does exist, the appropriate algorithm constructs one.
It is known that, for a given instance of SMP, the set of super-stable matchings
forms a finite distributive lattice [15]. However, in the case of weak stability, this struc-
ture is absent (under the ‘usual’ definitions of meet and join – c.f. [5, p.20]) even for
SMT: there is an instance I of SMT, containing three men, namely m1, m2, m3, and
three women, namely w1, w2, w3, which admits no man-optimal weakly stable matching.
This example, due to Roth [13], is reproduced in Figure 1 (in a preference list, per-
sons within parentheses are tied); the matchings M1 = {(m1, w1), (m2, w3), (m3, w2)} and
M2 = {(m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w3)} are the two unique weakly stable matchings in I.
Since man m1 has his first-choice partner in M1 and his second-choice partner in M2,
whereas man m2 has his second-choice partner in M1 and his first-choice partner in M2,
then no man-optimal weakly stable matching in I exists. However, the structure of the
set of matchings that are stable with respect to the remaining stability criterion, namely
strong stability, has remained open until now.
The main contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that, despite an apparent lack of
symmetry in the strong stability definition, strongly stable matchings in an SMT instance
nevertheless give rise to a finite distributive lattice. This result, presented in Section 2, is
obtained by defining an equivalence relation ∼ on the set of strongly stable matchings for a
given SMT instance; it is the set of equivalence classes under∼ which forms the distributive
lattice under a dominance relation closely related to ¹. Hence there is convincing evidence
that the problems mentioned previously for SM [4, 8] are also polynomial-time solvable
for SMT under strong stability 2.
2For the egalitarian and minimum regret stable matching problems, the cost of a matching in an instance
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In Section 3, we give a characterisation of the strongly stable matchings in a given
equivalence class in terms of perfect matchings of a suitably defined bipartite graph. One
use of this representation is to demonstrate how to generate efficiently the strongly stable
matchings in a given equivalence class.
The lattice structure for strong stability in an SMT instance does not carry over to
SMP: in Section 4, we construct an example instance of SMP in which the set of strongly
stable matchings does not form a lattice.
We also consider super-stable matchings briefly, in Section 5. As previously mentioned,
it has been shown that the set of super-stable matchings for an SMP instance I forms a
finite distributive lattice [15]. The result is established by noting that there is a set I of
instances of SM such that I ′ ∈ I if and only if I ′ may be obtained from I by resolving the
indifference in I in some way; as previously noted, a matching M is super-stable in I if
and only if M is stable in every member of I. Thus the set of super-stable matchings in
I is equal to
⋂
I′∈I S(I
′), where S(I ′) denotes the set of stable matchings in the instance
I ′ of SM. But each set S(I ′) forms a distributive lattice, and since the intersection of
distributive lattices is also a distributive lattice, the result follows.
In this paper, we outline an alternative approach which builds on results from Section 2
and leads to the same conclusion, but which avoids using the above intersection argument,
and which, we feel, provides a more intuitive picture of the structure of the set of super-
stable matchings in a given SMP instance. 3
Finally, we present some concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Strongly stable matchings form a distributive lattice
In this section we show that the set of strongly stable matchings for an instance of SMT
gives rise to a finite distributive lattice. Throughout this section, certain results are
proved for SMP (rather than SMT) for greater generality, and also with a view to their
exploitation in Section 5.
We begin with a definition which will be useful on a number of occasions henceforth.
Definition 2.1. Let I be an instance of SMP, and let M, M ′ be two strongly stable match-
ings in I. Construct an edge-coloured bipartite graph, denoted byM⊕M ′, as follows: form
a vertex for each person in I, and join any two vertices by a red (resp. blue) edge if the
corresponding people are matched in M but not M ′ (resp. M ′ but not M).
It is clear that the connected components of any such graph M ⊕M ′ are cycles, since
everybody is matched in each of M, M ′.
Our first result states that if some person p has different partners in two strongly stable
matchings M, M ′, then there is an important structural relationship between M and M ′.
Lemma 2.2. Let I be an instance of SMP, and let M, M ′ be two strongly stable matchings
in I. Suppose that, for any person p in I, (p, q) ∈ M and (p, q′) ∈ M ′, where q 6= q′ 4,
and p strictly prefers q′ to q or is indifferent between them. Then there is a cycle in
of SMP may be defined as follows. For a given person q, assume that ≺q denotes q’s preference poset,
where r ≺q s if and only if q strictly prefers r to s. The cost of a matching M for q is 1 plus the number
of predecessors in ≺q of pM (q).
3We remark that the structural results presented in Sections 2, 3 and 5 may be generalised to the case
that each person may declare certain members of the opposite sex as being unacceptable (in other words,
he or she would rather be unmatched than be matched with such a person). The details are omitted from
this paper.
4In this paper, we follow the convention that p is indifferent between q and q′ includes the possibility
that q = q′.
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M ⊕M ′, comprising alternating (man,woman) and (woman,man) pairs involving p, q and
q′ as follows: for some r > 1, there are r people p1, . . . , pr in I, all of the same sex, and
r people q1, . . . , qr in I, all of the opposite sex, such that
1. p1 = p, q1 = q and q2 = q
′.
2. (pi, qi) ∈ M (1 ≤ i ≤ r) and (pi, qi+1) ∈ M
′ (1 ≤ i ≤ r).
3. Case (i): p is indifferent between q′ and q implies that (a) pi is indifferent between
qi+1 and qi (1 ≤ i ≤ r), and (b) qi is indifferent between pi and pi−1 (1 ≤ i ≤ r).
Case (ii): p strictly prefers q′ to q implies that (a) pi strictly prefers qi+1 to qi
(1 ≤ i ≤ r), and (b) qi strictly prefers pi to pi−1 (1 ≤ i ≤ r),
where p0 = pr, pr+1 = p1 and qr+1 = q1.
Proof. Consider M ⊕M ′ as defined in Definition 2.1. In this graph, the vertices p, q, q′
are all in the same connected component G′. We claim that there is a sequence 〈pj〉j≥1 of
people in G′, all of the same sex, and a sequence 〈qj〉j≥1 of people in G
′, all of the opposite
sex, such that, for each i ≥ 1,
(a). {pi, qi} is a red edge and {pi, qi+1} is a blue edge.
(b). pi strictly prefers qi+1 to qi, or is indifferent between them.
We prove the claim by induction on i. The base case i = 1 clearly holds with p1 = p,
q1 = q and q2 = q
′. For an induction step, suppose that some k ≥ 1 is given, and assume
that the claim is true for i = k. We show that the claim holds for i = k + 1. Person qk+1
is incident to a red edge, {pk+1, qk+1} say, such that qk+1 strictly prefers pk+1 to pk or is
indifferent between them, for otherwise (pk, qk+1) blocks M . Also person pk+1 is incident
to a blue edge, {pk+1, qk+2} say, such that pk+1 strictly prefers qk+2 to qk+1 or is indifferent
between them, for otherwise (pk+1, qk+1) blocks M
′. This completes the inductive step.
Since G′ is a cycle, qr+1 = q, pr+1 = p and qr+2 = q
′, for some r > 1. Also, note that
for each i ≥ 2, qi strictly prefers pi to pi−1, or is indifferent between them, for otherwise
(pi−1, qi) blocks M . The remainder of the proof is split into two cases.
Case (i): p is indifferent between q′ and q. Then a similar induction to the above (swap-
ping the colours red and blue, and interpreting the indices of each pi, qj appropriately)
establishes that, for each i ≥ 1, pi strictly prefers qi to qi+1 or is indifferent between them,
and qi strictly prefers pi−1 to pi or is indifferent between them. Hence p1, . . . , pr and
q1, . . . , qr satisfy the required properties.
Case (ii): p strictly prefers q′ to q. Then the fact that p1, . . . , pr and q1, . . . , qr satisfy the
required properties may be established by considering the argument from the start of the
proof up to Case (i), and removing all occurrences of the phrase “or is indifferent between
them”.
The concepts of strict preference and indifference may be defined between matchings,
as well as between men and women, as follows. Let M, M ′ be any matchings in I, and let
q be any person in I. We say that q strictly prefers M to M ′ if q strictly prefers pM (q)
to pM ′(q). Also, we say that q is indifferent between M and M
′ if q is indifferent between
pM (q) and pM ′(q).
Lemma 2.2 leads to the following theorem, which plays an important role in establishing
the lattice structure.
Theorem 2.3. Let I be an instance of SMP, and let M, M ′ be two strongly stable match-
ings in I. Suppose that m and w are partners in M but not in M ′. Then either
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1. one of m, w strictly prefers M to M ′, and the other strictly prefers M ′ to M , or
2. both m and w are indifferent between M and M ′.
Proof. By Case (i) of Lemma 2.2, m is indifferent between M and M ′ if and only if w
is indifferent between M and M ′. Now suppose that m strictly prefers M to M ′. If w
strictly prefers M to M ′, then (m, w) blocks M ′. Hence, since w is not indifferent between
M and M ′, w strictly prefers M ′ to M . Finally, suppose that m strictly prefers M ′ to M .
Then by Case (ii) of Lemma 2.2, w strictly prefers M to M ′.
We proceed with the definition of the equivalence relation that will be central to our
construction of the lattice structure involving strongly stable matchings.
Definition 2.4. Let M be the set of strongly stable matchings for a given SMT instance
I. Define an equivalence relation ∼ on M as follows. For two strongly stable matchings
M, M ′ ∈M, M ∼M ′ if and only if each man is indifferent between M and M ′ . Denote
by C the set of equivalence classes ofM under ∼, and denote by [M ] the equivalence class
containing M , for M ∈M.
Note that ∼ is an equivalence relation, for indifference is transitive in an instance of
SMT. However, the transitivity of indifference cannot be guaranteed in an arbitrary SMP
instance (we see the consequences of this in Section 4). Definition 2.4 leads to the following
proposition, whose proof is immediate from the strong stability definition:
Proposition 2.5. Let I be an instance of SMT, and let M, M ′ be two strongly stable
matchings in I. Then M ∼ M ′ implies that each woman in I is indifferent between M
and M ′, where ∼ is as defined in Definition 2.4.
Recall from Section 1 the dominance partial order defined on the set of stable matchings
in an SM instance, where one stable matching M dominates another, M ′, if every man
has at least as good a partner in M as he has in M ′. We now give a formal definition of
this partial order defined on strongly stable matchings.
Definition 2.6. Let I be an instance of SMP and let M, M ′ be two strongly stable match-
ings. Then M dominates M ′, written M ¹ M ′, if each man either strictly prefers M to
M ′, or is indifferent between them.
We may extend ¹ to a partial order ¹∗ defined on equivalence classes as follows.
Definition 2.7. Let I be an instance of SMT and let C be as defined in Definition 2.4.
Define a partial order ¹∗ on C as follows: for any two equivalence classes [M ], [M ′] ∈ C,
[M ] ¹∗ [M ′] if and only if M ¹ M ′, where ¹ is as defined in Definition 2.6.
Note that the definition of (C,¹∗) is independent of the particular choices of represen-
tatives of the equivalence classes [M ] and [M ′]: if M ¹ M ′, then P ¹ P ′ for any P ∈ [M ]
and P ′ ∈ [M ′]. Also, observe that (C,¹∗) is a partial order, for, given any two strongly
stable matchings M, M ′, M ∼ M ′ if and only if M ¹ M ′ and M ′ ¹ M . We aim to show
that (C,¹∗) is a finite distributive lattice.
In order to establish the existence of a lattice structure, we require to define the meet
and the join of two equivalence classes. To this end, we make the following definition: given
two strongly stable matchings M, M ′ in an SMP instance I, let Uin(M, M
′) be the set of
men in I who are indifferent between M and M ′ (note that possibly Uin(M, M
′) = ∅.) Also,
by Case (i) of Lemma 2.2, there is a set of women Win(M, M
′) such that |Win(M, M
′)| =
|Uin(M, M
′)| and each woman in Win(M, M
′) is indifferent between M and M ′. Clearly,
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for every m ∈ Uin(M, M
′), {pM (m), pM ′(m)} ⊆ Win(M, M
′), and similarly, for every
w ∈ Win(M, M
′), {pM (w), pM ′(w)} ⊆ Uin(M, M
′).
The following result will be of use in our formulation of a meet operation between two
equivalence classes.
Lemma 2.8. Let I be an instance of SMP, and let M, M ′ be two strongly stable matchings
in I. Let M∗ be a set of (man,woman) pairs defined as follows: for each man m ∈
Uin(M, M
′), m has in M∗ the same partner as in M , and for each man m /∈ Uin(M, M
′),
m has in M∗ the better of his partners in M and M ′. Then M∗ is a strongly stable
matching.
Proof. Firstly, we show that M ∗ is a matching. Suppose that men m and m′ both have
some woman w as their partner in M ∗. Without loss of generality, suppose that (m, w) ∈
M and (m′, w) ∈ M ′; then m strictly prefers M to M ′ or is indifferent between them,
and m′ strictly prefers M ′ to M . Theorem 2.3 applied to the pair (m, w) implies that w
strictly prefers M ′ to M or is indifferent between them. But Theorem 2.3 applied to the
pair (m′, w) implies that w strictly prefers M to M ′, a contradiction. Hence M ∗ is indeed
a matching.
Now suppose that M ∗ is blocked by some pair (m, w). Suppose firstly that m strictly
prefers w to pM∗(m). Then w strictly prefers m to pM∗(w) or is indifferent between
them. Also, m strictly prefers w to both pM (m) and pM ′(m). If pM∗(w) = pM (w)
then (m, w) blocks M , and if pM∗(w) = pM ′(w) then (m, w) blocks M
′. But pM∗(w) ∈
{pM (w), pM ′(w)}, so we reach a contradiction.
Hence m is indifferent between w and pM∗(m). Thus w strictly prefers m to pM∗(w).
Also, m strictly prefers w to pM (m) or is indifferent between them, and m strictly prefers
w to pM ′(m) or is indifferent between them. If pM∗(w) = pM (w) then (m, w) blocks M ,
and if pM∗(w) = pM ′(w) then (m, w) blocks M
′. Again pM∗(w) ∈ {pM (w), pM ′(w)}, so
we have a contradiction. Hence M ∗ is strongly stable.
We denote by M∧M ′ the set of (man,woman) pairs in which each man m ∈ Uin(M, M
′)
receives the same partner as in M , and each man m /∈ Uin(M, M
′) receives the better of
his partners in M and M ′; by Lemma 2.8, M ∧M ′ is a strongly stable matching. Note
that it is not the case that, in general, M ∧M ′ = M ′ ∧M .
We now present a result along the same lines as Lemma 2.8, which will be of use in
our definition of a join operation between two equivalence classes.
Lemma 2.9. Let I be an instance of SMP, and let M, M ′ be two strongly stable matchings
in I. Let M∗ be a set of (man,woman) pairs defined as follows: for each man m ∈
Uin(M, M
′), m has in M∗ the same partner as in M , and for each man m /∈ Uin(M, M
′),
m has in M∗ the poorer of his partners in M and M ′. Then M∗ is a strongly stable
matching.
Proof. Clearly each woman in Win(M, M
′) has the same partner in M ∗ as she has in M .
If each man m /∈ Uin(M, M
′) is given the poorer of his partners in M and M ′, then by
Theorem 2.3, each woman w /∈ Win(M, M
′) receives the better of her partners in M and
M ′. The remainder of the proof is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma 2.8, with
the roles of the men and women reversed.
We denote by M∨M ′ the set of (man,woman) pairs in which each man m ∈ Uin(M, M
′)
receives the same partner as in M , and each man m /∈ Uin(M, M
′) receives the poorer of
his partners in M and M ′; by Lemma 2.9, M ∨M ′ is a strongly stable matching.
The operations ∧ and ∨ on strongly stable matchings have a number of properties, as
indicated by the following lemma.
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Lemma 2.10. Let I be an instance of SMT, and let M be the set of strongly stable
matchings in I. Then, for any X, Y, Z ∈M,
1. X ∧X = X
2. X ∨X = X
3. X ∧ Y ∼ Y ∧X
4. X ∨ Y ∼ Y ∨X
5. X ∧ (Y ∧ Z) = (X ∧ Y ) ∧ Z
6. X ∨ (Y ∨ Z) = (X ∨ Y ) ∨ Z
7. X ∧ (Y ∨ Z) = (X ∧ Y ) ∨ (X ∧ Z)
8. X ∨ (Y ∧ Z) = (X ∨ Y ) ∧ (X ∨ Z)
where ∼ is the equivalence relation onM as defined in Definition 2.4.
Proof. (1)-(4) are obvious from the definitions.
To show (5), let m be any man, let R = X ∧ (Y ∧Z) and let S = (X ∧ Y )∧Z. If m is
not indifferent between any pair of X, Y, Z, then it is clear that pR(m) = pS(m). Suppose
that m is indifferent between X, Y and Z. Then pR(m) = pX(m) = pS(m).
Now suppose that m is indifferent between two of X, Y, Z only, namely A, B, where
A ∈ {X, Y } and B ∈ {Y, Z}, without loss of generality. Let C be such that {A, B, C} =
{X, Y, Z}. If m strictly prefers C to each of A, B, then pR(m) = pC(m) = pS(m). Other-
wise, m strictly prefers each of A, B to C, and pR(m) = pA(m) = pS(m).
The proof that (6) holds is similar.
To show (7), let m be any man, let R = X ∧ (Y ∨ Z) and let S = (X ∧ Y ) ∨ (X ∧ Z).
If m is not indifferent between any pair of X, Y, Z, then the proof that pR(m) = pS(m)
follows by the corresponding proof in Theorem 1.3.2 of [5].
Now suppose that m is indifferent between Y and Z only. If m strictly prefers X to
Y , then pR(m) = pX(m) = pS(m). Otherwise, m strictly prefers Y to X, and pR(m) =
pY (m) = pS(m).
If m is indifferent between X, Y and Z, or m is indifferent between X and Y only, or
m is indifferent between X and Z only, then pR(m) = pX(m) = pS(m).
The proof that (8) holds is similar.
We are now in a position to present our main result of this section.
Theorem 2.11. Let I be an instance of SMT, and let M be the set of strongly stable
matchings in I. Let C be the set of equivalence classes of M under ∼, and let ¹∗ be the
dominance partial order on C, where ∼ and ¹∗ are as defined in Definitions 2.4 and 2.7
respectively. Then (C,¹∗) forms a finite distributive lattice, with [M∧M ′] representing the
meet of [M ] and [M ′], and [M ∨M ′] the join, for two equivalence classes [M ], [M ′] ∈ C.
Proof. By Lemmas 2.8 and 2.9, [M ∧M ′] ∈ C and [M ∨M ′] ∈ C. Also, by Lemma 2.8,
M ∧ M ′ ¹ M and M ∧ M ′ ¹ M ′, so that [M ∧ M ′] ¹∗ [M ] and [M ∧ M ′] ¹∗ [M ′].
Similarly, by Lemma 2.9, M ¹ M ∨M ′ and M ′ ¹M ∨M ′, so that [M ] ¹∗ [M ∨M ′] and
[M ′] ¹∗ [M ∨M ′],
Now suppose that [M ∗] ¹∗ [M ] and [M∗] ¹∗ [M ′], for any strongly stable matching
M∗. Then M∗ ¹ M and M∗ ¹ M ′, so that each man has at least as good a partner in
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M∗ as he has in each of M and M ′. Hence M∗ ¹ M ∧M ′, so that [M∗] ¹∗ [M ∧M ′],
and hence [M ∧M ′] is the greatest lower bound of [M ] and [M ′]. By a similar argument,
[M ∨M ′] is the least upper bound of [M ] and [M ′]. Hence by Lemma 2.10, (C,¹∗) is a
finite distributive lattice.
3 Characterising strongly stable matchings in an equiva-
lence class
In this section we give a representation of the strongly stable matchings in an equivalence
class in terms of perfect matchings of a bipartite graph. We begin with a definition which
will feature in the construction of this graph.
Definition 3.1. Let I be an instance of SMT. For any persons p, q in I, not both of the
same sex, let T (p, q) denote the set of people tied with q in p’s preference list.
Note that in the above definition, T (p, q) 6= ∅, since q ∈ T (p, q). We now define the
bipartite graph that forms the basis of our equivalence class representation.
Definition 3.2. Let I be an instance of SMT, and let M be a strongly stable matching in
I. Define the equivalence graph, HM = (V, E), of M as follows: let V = U ∪W , where
U, W are the sets of men and women in I respectively, and
E = {(m, w) : w ∈ T (m, pM (m)) ∧m ∈ T (w, pM (w))} .
For a given equivalence class C, the perfect matchings in the corresponding equivalence
graph are exactly the strongly stable matchings in C, as the following result indicates.
Theorem 3.3. Let I be an instance of SMT, and let M be a strongly stable matching in
I. Let M ′ be any matching in I. Then M ′ is strongly stable with M ′ ∼ M if and only if
M ′ is a perfect matching in HM , where ∼ is as defined in Definition 2.4 and HM = (V, E)
is the equivalence graph of M .
Proof. Suppose that M ′ is strongly stable and M ′ ∼ M . Let (m, w) be any (man,woman)
pair in M ′. Then m is indifferent between w and pM (m), so that w ∈ T (m, pM (m)). Also,
by Proposition 2.5, w is indifferent between m and pM (w), so that m ∈ T (w, pM (w)).
Hence (m, w) ∈ E, so that M ′ is a perfect matching in HM .
Conversely suppose that M ′ is a perfect matching in HM . Suppose that some un-
matched (man,woman) pair (m, w) blocks M ′. Now m is indifferent between pM (m) and
pM ′(m). Also, w is indifferent between pM (w) and pM ′(w). Hence (m, w) blocks M , a
contradiction. Thus M ′ is strongly stable in I. Clearly M ′ ∼ M .
A consequence of the representation of Theorem 3.3 is that strongly stable matchings
may be efficiently generated in a given equivalence class. More specifically, we now show
that, having found a strongly stable matching M in an SMT instance I of size n (which
may be achieved in O(n4) time [6]), we may generate all of the remaining strongly stable
matchings in [M ] with a delay of O(n2) time per matching.
Corollary 3.4. Let I be an instance of SMT, and let M be the set of strongly stable
matchings in I. Let C be the set of equivalence classes of M under ∼, where ∼ is as
defined in Definition 2.4. Then for any [M ] ∈ C, the strongly stable matchings in [M ] may
be generated efficiently.
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m1 : w1 w2 . . . w1 : m2 m5 m1 . . .
m2 : w2 w1 . . . w2 : m1 m2 . . .
m3 : w4 w3 . . . w3 : m3 m6 m4 . . .
m4 : w3 w4 . . . w4 : m4 m3 . . .
m5 :
w6︷ ︸︸ ︷
w5 w1 . . .
w5 : (m5 m6) . . .
m6 :
w6︷ ︸︸ ︷
w5 w3 . . .
w6 : (m5 m6) . . .
Figure 2: An instance of SMP with no man-optimal strongly stable matching.
Proof. Let HM be the equivalence graph of M . By Theorem 3.3, M
′ ∈ [M ] if and only
if M ′ is a perfect matching in HM . The set of perfect matchings in a bipartite graph G
may be generated efficiently [2]: once an initial perfect matching in G has been found
(in this case, such a matching is M), all of the remaining perfect matchings in G may be
generated with a delay of O(n2) time per matching. The whole enumeration process takes
O(n3) space.
The question as to whether this enumeration may be achieved by constructing an
initial strongly stable matching in O(n2) time, and then by generating subsequent strongly
stable matchings with a delay of O(n) time per strongly stable matching, and furthermore
by using O(n2) space overall, which are all optimal bounds (and achievable for stable
matchings in an instance of SM [4]), remains open.
4 Strongly stable matchings in an SMP instance
In this section, we construct an instance I of SMP with the property that the strongly
stable matchings in I do not form a lattice (with respect to the meet and join definitions
of Section 2). The instance I contains six men, namely m1, m2, . . . , m6, and six women,
namely w1, w2, . . . , w6. The preference posets for each person in I are shown in Figure 2
(the symbol ‘. . .’ in a person’s preference poset denotes all remaining people of the opposite
sex listed in arbitrary strict order at the point where the symbol appears). Note that each
of men m5, m6 is indifferent between woman w6 and woman wi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 5. Given that
the indifference in the men’s preference posets does not take the form of ties, the instance
I of SMP is not an instance of SMT.
Now consider the matchings M1 = {(mi, wi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ 6} and M2 = {(m1, w2),
(m2, w1), (m3, w4), (m4, w3), (m5, w6), (m6, w5)}. It may be verified that each of M1, M2
is strongly stable in I. However, each of men m1, m2 has his first-choice partner in M1 and
his second-choice partner in M2, whereas each of men m3, m4 has his second-choice partner
in M1 and his first-choice partner in M2. Now let M be any strongly stable matching in I.
It may be verified that (m1, w1) ∈ M if and only if (m2, w2) ∈ M , and also (m3, w4) ∈ M
if and only if (m4, w3) ∈ M . Suppose, without loss of generality, that (m1, w1) ∈ M and
(m4, w3) ∈ M . Then each of m5, m6 must be matched in M with a partner strictly better
than w1, w3, respectively. Since the only such woman is w5 in each case, no such M exists.
Hence no man-optimal strongly stable matching (or equivalence class) in I exists, which
rules out the possibility of there being a lattice structure for the strongly stable matchings
in I, given the the meet and join definitions of Section 2.
Note that in the example I above, indifference occurs on both the men’s side and
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the women’s side. In general, this is a necessary condition for the lattice structure to
be absent. For, if indifference occurs on one side only, then the strong stability criterion
is equivalent to the super-stability criterion, and super-stable matchings in an arbitrary
SMP instance do form a lattice [15].
5 Super-stability
In this section, we briefly outline an alternative strategy from the one used by Spieker
[15] to show that the set of super-stable matchings for an SMP instance forms a finite
distributive lattice. The basis of our method is the following lemma, which demonstrates
that if a person has different partners in two super-stable matchings, then he/she cannot
be indifferent between them. This useful property of super-stable matchings is not stated
explicitly in [15].
Lemma 5.1. Let I be an instance of SMP, and letM, M ′ be two super-stable matchings in
I. Suppose that, for any person p in I, (p, q) ∈ M and (p, q′) ∈ M ′, where p is indifferent
between q and q′. Then q = q′.
Proof. Suppose q 6= q′. Since M and M ′ are strongly stable, we may invoke Case (i) of
Lemma 2.2. We then find that (p, q′) blocks M , a contradiction.
Let M be the set of super-stable matchings for a given SMP instance I. Consider ¹,
the dominance partial order of Definition 2.6, now defined on M. The insight into the
structure of super-stable matchings in an SMP instance provided by Lemma 5.1 allows us
to follow an approach along the lines of that employed in Section 2, in order to show that
(M,¹) forms a finite distributive lattice. We begin with the analogue of Theorem 2.3 for
super-stability.
Theorem 5.2. Let I be an instance of SMP, and let M, M ′ be two super-stable matchings
in I. Suppose that m and w are partners in M but not in M ′. Then one of m, w strictly
prefers M to M ′, and the other strictly prefers M ′ to M .
Proof. By Lemma 5.1, neither m nor w is indifferent between M and M ′. Hence, as M, M ′
are both strongly stable, the result follows by Theorem 2.3.
It is a straightforward matter to modify the proofs of Lemmas 2.8 and 2.9 to establish
the super-stability analogues; we omit the details. Thus we have:
Lemma 5.3. Let I be an instance of SMP, and let M, M ′ be two super-stable matchings
in I. Let M∗ be a set of (man,woman) pairs defined by giving each man m the better of
his partners in M and M ′. Then M∗ is a super-stable matching.
Lemma 5.4. Let I be an instance of SMP, and let M, M ′ be two super-stable matchings
in I. Let M∗ be a set of (man,woman) pairs defined by giving each man m the poorer of
his partners in M and M ′. Then M∗ is a super-stable matching.
We denote by M ∧M ′ (resp. M ∨M ′) the set of (man,woman) pairs in which each
man receives the better (resp. poorer) of his partners in M and M ′. We are now in a
position to state our main result of this section.
Theorem 5.5. Let I be an instance of SMP, and letM be the set of super-stable matchings
in I. Then (M,¹) forms a finite distributive lattice, with M ∧M ′ representing the meet
of M and M ′, and M ∨M ′ the join, for two super-stable matchings M, M ′ ∈ M, where
¹ is the dominance partial order of Definition 2.6, now defined onM.
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Proof. By Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4, M ∧M ′ ∈M and M ∨M ′ ∈M. The proof that M ∧M ′
is the greatest lower bound of M and M ′, and M ∨M ′ is the least upper bound of M
and M ′, is along the same lines as the corresponding part of the proof of Theorem 2.11.
Clearly, each of the meet and join operations is idempotent, commutative and associative.
It also follows by Theorem 1.3.2 of [5] that the meet and join operations distribute over
each other. Hence (M,¹) is a finite distributive lattice.
6 Conclusions and open problems
As mentioned previously, it remains open as to whether the lattice structure for SMT
under strong stability can be exploited so as to yield efficient algorithms for the problems of
finding an egalitarian strongly stable matching, a minimum regret strongly stable matching
and all strongly stable pairs (i.e. determining, for each man m and woman w, whether m
and w are partners in some strongly stable matching) for a given SMT instance. Although
we have suggested a strategy for listing strongly stable matchings in a given equivalence
class under ∼, the general problem of listing all strongly stable matchings in an SMT
instance also remains open. Each of these four problems is also open for SMP under super-
stability, but the existence of a lattice structure, and Lemma 5.1 in particular, provides
strong evidence that all four problems are efficiently solvable. On the other hand, the
situation for SMP under strong stability is likely to be different, in view of Section 4.
Indeed, the problem of deciding whether a given instance of SMP admits a strongly stable
matching is NP-complete [11].
In the case of weak stability however, the efficient solvability of three of the aforemen-
tioned problems is known to be unlikely. The problems of finding an egalitarian weakly
stable matching and a minimum regret weakly stable matching in an SMT instance I are
both NP-hard, and are not approximable within n1−ε, for any ε > 0, where n is the number
of people in I, unless P=NP [9, 12]. In addition, the problem of determining, for a given
SMT instance and a given man m and woman w, whether m and w are partners in some
weakly stable matching, is also NP-hard [12]. Each of these results holds in the restricted
case that every tie is of length two, there is at most one tie per preference list, and the
ties occur in the preference lists of one sex only (these conditions holding simultaneously).
Finally, the question as to whether all weakly stable matchings in a given SMT instance
may be generated efficiently (in the sense described in Section 3) remains open, though
we conjecture that the answer will be in the negative.
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